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Despite the significant role of superannuation funds in maintaining the 
sustainability of national retirement schemes, little is known about 
their governance structure. Our research found that very few 
Australian superannuation funds voluntarily disclose information 
about their main controlling body — the board of trustees. The current 
low level of disclosure by boards of trustees, including information 
about trustees, raises questions about the selection and review of 
trustees, and their accountability to fund members. 
Australian superannuation funds are controlled by trustees. The recent Super System 
Review commissioned by the Commonwealth Government pointed out that almost all 
issues in the superannuation system can be linked to trustee governance.1 
Superannuation fund trustees have the duty of safeguarding members’ interests and 
mitigating investment managers’ and financial intermediaries’ self-fulfilling behaviours. 
Trustees’ expertise and knowledge are very important2 since it is impossible to require 
every superannuation fund member to have adequate financial literacy (Cooper 2010). 
The current management structure of Australian superannuation funds involves multiple 
agents each holding various sets of information. Trustees and fund managers are the 
prominent agents in superannuation funds. Trustees provide oversight of members’ 
contributions and monitor the performance of internal and external agents. It is the duty 
of trustees to minimise the gap between the superannuation fund objectives and other 
agents’ objectives through clear mandates and communication policies, effective 
monitoring and reviews. We argue that trustees, not management, are the main holders 
of information about superannuation funds’ operations (except in terms of investment 
strategies and processes).  
The governance of Australian superannuation funds rests upon the ‘prudent man rule’ 
according to which trustees are expected to exercise skill, duty of care, and diligence.3 
This rule is less stringent than the ‘prudent business person’ rule applied to corporate 
directors by general law (Donald 2011) and allows more flexibility in the requirements 
and expectations of trustees’ skills and expertise. This does not necessarily imply that 
trustees have fewer skills and less expertise compared with corporate directors. 
However, the relevant policy requirements set by superannuation funds are currently 
deficient (Sy et al. 2008). In terms of disclosure, there is no clear requirement for the 
scope of information that is to be included in a superannuation fund’s annual report, nor 
is there any specific standard for these annual reports. Our survey of all the 2009 
industry superannuation funds annual reports revealed inconsistent disclosure practices 
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with regard to the breadth and depth of information being published. A key indicator of a 
superannuation fund’s corporate governance is the transparency with which it is 
managed and the accountability of its agents.  
While corporate governance literature lends an important framework to examine trustee 
governance, there are stark differences between corporate boards and trustee boards. 
Corporate directors are elected by shareholders to safeguard their interests and 
maximise the value of their share capital. Superannuation fund boards of trustees may 
be comprised of natural person4 trustees or companies that provide trustee services.5 
The agency relationship is more complex with companies acting as trustees (Donald 
2011). In this paper, we refer to both natural person trustees and directors of trustee 
companies as trustees. 
Corporate directors are driven by financial gains while trustees have a different set of 
complex goals and objectives. The type of funds trustees are associated with influences 
their objectives and decision-making framework. For example, industry superannuation 
funds are not-for-profit organisations, while retail funds focus on generating capital 
appreciation for the shareholders of the parent financial institutions and returns for their 
fund members. Hence, the success of a corporation is mainly measured in terms of 
financial gains and capital appreciation, while superannuation fund trustees may prioritise 
legal compliance alongside members’ interests (Gupta et al. 2007). The compensation 
package of corporate directors often includes shares and options that are designed to 
align their interests with those of the shareholders. Consistent with APRA’s study (Sy et 
al. 2008), our data shows that some trustees do not receive any fee for their services. 
Individuals’ motivation to undertake trustee positions may be very different from those of 
the corporate directors, including for example, a desire to develop their reputation and 
gain experience within the superannuation funds industry; it is within this context that we 
develop our hypotheses below. 
Literature and hypothesis development 
Disclosure can signal the values and development of a firm, product, or worker (Stiglitz 
1979), and it is especially important in mitigating shirking behaviours in markets filled with 
dispersed ownership structures (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Management influences 
accounting information, information type and disclosure frequency based on their self-
interest and other constraints (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Leftwich et al. 1981). This 
underpins the hypothesis developed below. 
Governance practices, including disclosure, are influenced by the regulatory environment 
in which a firm operates: the more stringent the regulation, the better the practices 
observed (Gillan 2006). Where there is no clear legal requirement and standard for 
disclosure, we argue that voluntary disclosure is dependent on the trustee structure and 
trustees’ background: 
iSizeDCBSOUTINDEDUNOMDIS   7654321 %            (1) 
The model above shows that the degree of disclosure (DIS) for each superannuation 
fund depends on a function of nominator type (NOM), the educational background of 
trustees (EDU),6 board independence (IND), outside directorship (OUT), board size (BS), 
trustee compensation measured by trustees’ fees (DC), and fund size in terms of value of 
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funds under management and membership base (Size). The following two main 
hypotheses are postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Voluntary disclosure is dependent on the trustee structure.  
Hypothesis 2: Trustees’ backgrounds have a relationship with voluntary disclosure. 
Trustee Nomination (NOM) is an exogenous variable. Given that the nature of the 
relationship between the nominator and trustees could vary, the level of information 
shared between them may also differ. We argue that the types of association between 
nominator and trustees affect the level of insider information access, selection of skills 
and expertise and, hence, influence disclosure practices. 
Trustees’ Educational Background (EDU): In corporate governance, the role of a 
board of directors includes providing assurance to shareholders and potential investors 
due to the expectation that the directors will provide valuable insights as a result of their 
financial expertise, and facilitate effective monitoring (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2009). 
Trustees who have higher financial proficiency tend to handle complex issues and 
evolving trends better (Gupta et al. 2007). We argue that trustees with higher levels of 
education (or who choose to disclose their educational background) are more aware of 
governance practices and development; they are also more likely to be driven to develop 
positive personal reputation in the market for future gains. 
Independent Trustees (IND) and Outside Directorships (OUT): Outside (independent) 
directors are negatively related to disclosure due to the substitution effect between the 
two (Eng and Mak 2003). In addition, the degree of information asymmetry between 
outside directors and firm insiders, such as the CEO, affects how the former could 
contribute to firm value; the high cost of information will reduce the value of outside 
directors to a firm (Duchin et al. 2010). Independent non-executive directors are also 
associated with the provision of comprehensive information in mandatory financial 
disclosures (Chen and Jaggi 2000). The degree of board independence has a positive 
correlation with the board’s financial expertise, which suggests a complementary 
relationship between the two (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2009). Trustees who hold multiple 
outside directorships may benefit from a diversity of knowledge, information and 
resources, and are likely to be associated with better disclosure of information about 
trustee structure and composition since their networking essentially capitalises on their 
reputations. 
Board Size (BS): Board size may be affected by fund size, fund growth rate and the 
merger activities of funds. We argue that as trustee board size grows, there will be an 
increased diversification of trustees’ expertise, a reduction in monitoring costs by 
trustees, and an improved balance of representation of members’ interests. This leads to 
improved disclosure policies and practices. In addition, larger boards may tap into better 
resources and information for the selection of asset consultants and fund managers. 
Control Variables: Trustee compensation and fund size 
Trustee compensation indicates if a trustee is providing services on the basis of 
competitive incentives. Based on the signalling hypothesis, this is an important control for 
identifying whether trustees provide disclosure in order to increase their future earnings 
and/or improve their future prospects in the labour market. The size and complexity of a 
firm may lead to variations in board structure due to the variances in monitoring costs 
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and information complexity (Boone et al. 2007). Hence, firm size affects voluntary 
disclosure via its effects on governance variables (Kelton and Yang). Therefore, we 
argue that fund size may have an impact on disclosure. 
Methodology  
Members rely on product disclosure statements (PDS) and annual reports for information 
on their superannuation funds’ structure, operation and performance. We followed this 
path and collected governance variables by downloading all annual reports, PDS and 
trustee information published by industry superannuation funds on their websites. We 
then conducted searches using the internet search engine Google and two databases — 
Business Who’s Who in Australia and Company 360 — to collect information about 
trustees’ educational background and outside directorships. We have only collected data 
for the financial year 2009 because the information on the governance of superannuation 
funds is limited and past years’ records is usually not maintained on websites. Since 
nomination of trustees for each type of superannuation funds is exogenous, we do not 
expect any endogeneity issue between trustee governance variables and disclosure 
level. We obtained industry superannuation funds financial data (trustee fee and fund 
size) from APRA for the period 2004–09. Due to the limited availability of data and our 
focus on trustees, we define fund voluntary disclosure through the level of disclosure 
about trustees’ profiles. Specifically, voluntary disclosure is a product of: 
DIS Index 
= the percentage of trustees who disclose the field of their formal education  
x the percentage of trustees who disclose the level of their completed education 
x the percentage of trustees who disclose their outside directorship(s) 
We measure trustee nomination by the type of nominator as reported by the 
superannuation funds. The types of nominator include independent party, member, 
employer, industry association bodies and professional trustee company. Trustees’ 
educational backgrounds are measured by the product of (1) educational completion 
level (i.e. diploma or school-leavers, undergraduate and postgraduate levels); (2) 
specialised fields (i.e. business and economics, arts and law, science, and others); and 
(3) whether a trustee has financial, governance, or superannuation industry management 
expertise. For the third measure, we use trustees’ professional memberships (CPA, CA, 
FAICD, CFA, CFP, ASFA, FSIA and AIST)7 as a proxy of their expertise and to 
determine access to resources and information relevant to the superannuation funds 
industry.  
Board size measures the total number of trustees on each board.8 We derived two 
proxies for board independence: (1) the percentage of independent trustees per board; 
(2) a dummy variable that indicates whether there are any independent trustees on each 
board. Outside directorship is measured by the number of directorships external to the 
sample superannuation funds that a trustee holds. Trustee compensation is measured in 
terms of total trustee fee. Fund size is measured in terms of year-end fund value and 
membership base.  
Results 
Current landscape  
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We surveyed 529 trustees from all 66 industry superannuation funds. Our results are 
comparable to those of Gupta et al. (2007)9 and APRA’s survey10 (Sy et al. 2008). With a 
total of 1,319 trustees in the whole industry, according to APRA’s 2008 survey (Sy et al. 
2008), our sample consists of approximately 40 per cent of the trustee population. Table 
1 shows the descriptive statistics: one set for trustee level, and another set for fund level. 
Descriptive statistics at the trustee level in Table 1 provide an outlook of Australian 
industry superannuation funds trustees’ background, as well as their funds disclosure 
practices and committee structures. 
An average board has nine trustees, which is consistent with past surveys (Gupta et al. 
2007; Sy et al. 2008). The number of outside directorships held by trustees in the 
industry superannuation funds (2.96 per trustee in Table 2) is slightly lower than the 
overall industry average of 3.5 (Sy et al. 2008). In terms of board committee, only 14.6 
per cent within our sample had disclosed audit, risk and compliance committees, 7 per 
cent had disclosed finance committees, and 80 per cent had disclosed investment 
committees. These results were much lower than those in the APRA survey, which found 
that 76 per cent of all funds had both independent audit and regular self-assessments for 
regulatory compliance review (Sy et al. 2008); this indicates a poor level of current 
disclosure practices concerning governance information. An average trustee received 
$1083.77 in fees in 2009, and $632.17 (on average) in 2004–09. This is significantly 
lower than the average remuneration of $38,000 in the APRA survey; however, the 
survey also found that 54 per cent of trustees did not receive any remuneration for their 
service, or did not declare their fees (Sy et al. 2008). 
- Insert Table 1 around here - 
Overall, voluntary disclosure of trustee board committees is low. Approximately 5.1 per 
cent of trustees do not disclose their nominators, while over 70 per cent of them do not 
disclose their educational and professional background. On the other hand, only about 5 
per cent of trustees are sitting on the board of funds that do not disclose whether they 
have independent trustees.  
- Insert Table 2 around here - 
Approximately 44 per cent of trustees in the sample are nominated by 
industry/professional associations/unions, while 40 per cent are nominated by members 
(Table 2). Only 8.51 per cent are nominated by trustees’ employers. This compares with 
32 per cent of trustees within the industry who are employer-representatives and 20 per 
cent who are member-representatives (Sy et al. 2008). Nomination is highly transparent 
as only 5.1 per cent of trustee nomination is not disclosed. Based on disclosed 
information, almost 15 per cent of trustees have attained undergraduate qualifications 
10.21 per cent have a postgraduate education, and 4.54 per cent are diploma holders or 
school-leavers. This is significantly lower than the results in the APRA’s survey (Sy et al. 
2008) which indicated that 65 per cent of trustees reported having university degrees, 
while only 11 per cent reported not holding any formal qualifications. 
Trustees in Science and other fields, including Education, Carpentry, Trade Services and 
Engineering are the group that has the highest levels of disclosure (13.42 per cent), 
followed by trustees in Arts & Law (7.56 per cent) and Business & Economics (5.48 per 
cent). In addition, 71.6 per cent of trustees did not disclose whether they have financial 
expertise, 9.83 per cent of trustees disclosed that they have financial expertise, and 18.5 
per cent disclosed that they do not have financial expertise. In comparison, Gupta et al. 
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(2007) found that 40 per cent of their surveyed trustees have a background in finance, 
but only 14.5 per cent of the 131 respondents have formal investment qualifications. The 
differences between our findings and those of Gupta et al. (2007) and Sy et al. (2008) 
provide a strong indication of continued poor disclosure practices. 
Approximately 60 per cent of the sample trustees were not associated with complete 
audit, risk and compliance (ARC) committees on their board. Only 8.13 per cent have 
disclosed complete ARC, while 32 per cent are associated with non-disclosed ARC 
committee structures. Only 4.73 per cent of trustees were associated with a financial 
committee; in contrast, 54.25 per cent were associated with an investment committee on 
their board. 
Regression analysis 
In this section, we discuss what drives trustees to disclose information about themselves 
and how their educational and professional backgrounds relate to trustee board 
committees. We use Model (1) to test our research question on voluntary disclosure with 
a different proxy of trustee’s background6 and fund size to check for robustness. Table 3 
shows the OLS results for EDU and completion level models only.  
- Insert Table 3 around here – 
H1 is weakly supported. We found member-nominated trustees have a negative effect on 
the disclosure of trustees’ information. However, the effect of nomination by association 
is not significant. This result is not robust in other models. The connection between 
individuals and their nominators based on implicit long-term network and evaluation may 
be a more significant factor in the nomination process than selection from an open 
market based on competitive professional profiles. Board size is negatively related to 
voluntary disclosure in the completion-level model. 
H2 is supported by our results where a higher level of educational background has a 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure when EDU index and formal qualification 
are used. Buseco and Artlaw both contribute positive effects to disclosure (results not 
reported in table). However, completion level models are not significant. This is in line 
with the signalling argument and consistent with the results for board independence. In 
contrast, IND per cent11 is found to be significant in all models, implying that the balance 
of control between independent trustees and other trustees on a board relies on the 
number of independent trustees relative to the size of the board. The coefficients for IND 
percentage in all models are the strongest with a positive impact in all models. This 
shows that the higher the number of independent trustees, the stronger their voices and 
influence on other trustees and board matters. The number of outside directorships 
(OUT) also has a significant but lesser positive impact on voluntary disclosure. The 
results support our hypothesis that board independence is positively related to voluntary 
disclosure, based on the notion that part of trustees’ future earnings growth is dependent 
on their current development and promotion of their reputational properties. In addition, 
independent trustees and trustees who have multiple outside directorships may have 
more resources with which to obtain up-to-date governance knowledge and practices, 
and wider experiences in undertaking board duties. 
Trustee fees (DC2009 and DC Average) do not appear to have any impact on voluntary 
disclosure. The relative low compensation level for trustees may have little effect on 
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driving trustee and board performance as a whole. We found that the larger the fund (in 
terms of fund value and number of members), the higher the level of voluntary 
disclosure. This supports the argument that larger funds are more capable and resourced 
to cope with disclosure costs. It could also be argued that larger funds attract a higher 
level of analyst coverage, which demands a higher level of transparency from the funds. 
 
Conclusions 
We surveyed Australian industry superannuation funds to investigate their trustee board 
structure and composition, trustees’ backgrounds, and current voluntary disclosure 
practices. Our findings shed light on understandings of trustee governance and show that 
current disclosure practices are poor. 
We found that more highly qualified trustees are related to better levels of voluntary 
disclosure of their background profile. In addition, independent trustees and trustees who 
have higher number of outside directorships have a strong positive effect on levels of 
voluntary disclosure. This is due to their higher need for the promotion and development 
of their reputational properties with anticipation for future personal earnings growth. Our 
empirical results show strong inter-relationships between these characteristics and 
confirm the significance of the make-up of trustees’ boards for standards of funds 
governance. These unique results provide important insights for policymakers, 
regulators, and practitioners in the regulation of the industry, and the enforcement of 
trustee accountability. Another important next step will be to test the impact of trustee 
governance on fund returns and risk. 
Despite the limitations in the availability of information and the impact this had on the 
research methodologies we could employ, this study provides an important, innovative 
view of trustee governance that establishes new directions for the field. Further research 
in this area will enhance the understanding of trustee governance and its impact on fund 
returns and risk management. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics of variables at trustee and fund level 
Panel A: Trustee Level Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observation 
Association-Nominated (dummy) - 1 0 0.4989 502 
Member-Nominated (dummy) - 1 0 0.4947 502 
EDU 1.9530  9.0000  0.0000  3.1316  127 
Undergraduate (dummy) - 1 0 0.5016 157 
Postgraduate (dummy) - 1 0 0.4765 157 
Buseco (dummy) - 1 0 0.5005 146 
Artlaw (dummy) - 1 0 0.4599 146 
IND (%)   0.0915  1.0000  0.0000  0.1571  503 
IND Dummy  -  1  0  -  503 
OUT   2.9624  16.0000  0.0000  2.5146  266 
Board Size   9.1680  17  4  3.1590  512 
DIS   0.6347  1.0000  0.0000  0.3371  529 
DF2009 ($'000)  968.18  22483.00  0.00  3365.56  523 
DF Average ($'000)  589.34  15430.00  0.00  2078.96  519 
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Log Size 2009  13.6574  17.0500  8.9980  1.6249  510 
Log Avg Size   13.4578  16.7200  8.9267  1.5671  523 
Member 2009   188359  1965511  675  383826  523 
Member Avg 6 yrs  148298  1701759  709  283900  529 
ARC (dummy) -  1  0 0.3248  360 
FIN (dummy) -  1  0 0.2546  360 
INV (dummy) -  1  0 0.4026  360 
Panel B: Fund Level 
IND (%)  0.0994 1.0000 0 0.1827 61 
IND Dummy - 1 0 0.5035 61 
OUT%  0.4919 1.0000 0.0000 0.3429 66 
Board Size S  8.1270 17 4 2.932 63 
DIS  0.6252 1.0000 0.0000 0.3576 66 
DF2009 ($'000) 1083.77 22483.00 0.0000 3592.5 65 
DF Average ($'000) 632.17 15430.00 0.0000 2073.27 64 
Log Size 2009 13.6378 17.0513 8.9980 1.6947 63 
Log Avg Size  13.4498 16.7244 8.9267 1.6168 65 
Member 2009  211225 1965511 675 416399 65 
Member Avg 6 yrs 160733 1701759 709 293174 66 
ARC (dummy) - 1 0 0.3578 41 
FIN (dummy) - 1 0 0.2637 41 
INV (dummy) - 1 0 0.4012 41 
Association-Nominated: 1= nominated by unions/professional association, 0 otherwise. Member-nominated: 1= nominated 
by members, 0 otherwise. EDU is an index that measures completion level, qualification and expertise of a trustee. 
Undergraduate: 1= completed undergraduate studies, 0 otherwise. Postgraduate: 1= completed postgraduate studies, 0 
otherwise. Buseco: 1= completed business, economics, accounting and/or finance formal qualifications, 0 otherwise. Artlaw: 
1= completed art and/or law formal qualifications, 0 otherwise. IND Dummy: 1= one or more independent trustees are 
present on the board. DIS is an index that measures the disclosed overall completion level, educational field and outside 
directorship per board. OUT measures the number of outside directorship a trustee holds and OUT% measures the 
percentage of trustees who have outside directorships. BS measures the total number of trustees per board. DF 2009 and 
DF Average measure the total trustee fees for the single period 2008/2009 and an average of 6 years trustee fees for the 
period 2004 – 2009) respectively. Log Size 2009, Log Avg Size, Member 2009 and Member Avg 6 yrs are proxies for fund 
size. Log Size 2009 and Log Avg Size show the total fund value for the single period 2009 and an average of 6 years fund 
value for the period 2004 – 2009) respectively. Member 2009 and Member AVG 6 yrs measure the total number of members 
for the single period 2009 and an average of 6 years number of members for the period 2004 – 2009) respectively. ARC, FIN 
and INV represent the presence of audit, risk and compliance committees, Financial committee and Investment committee. 
IND% represents the percentage of independent trustees on the trustee board.  
 
TABLE 2: The distribution of trustees’ backgrounds and nominators, trustee 
board independence and committee structure as disclosed by funds 
Variables 
Number of 
observations 
(n=529) % 
Variables 
Number of 
observations 
(n=529) % 
Board Independence Dummy 
(IND) Trustee Nominator 
NA 26   4.9 NA 27   5.1
No 246 46.5 Association 231 43.7
Yes 257 48.6 Employer 45   8.5
 Independent 13   2.5
Committee Structure Member 213 40.3
Audit, Risk and Compliance (ARC)  
NA 169 32.0 Completion 
No 317 59.9 NA 372 70.3
Yes 43   8.1 Dipl. or school 24   4.5
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leavers 
   Undergraduate 79 14.9
   Postgraduate 54 10.2
  
Financial Committee (FIN) Qualification 
NA 169 32.0 NA 389 73.5
No 335 63.3 Science & Other 71 13.4
Yes 25   4.7 Arts & Law 40   7.6
   Bus. & Econ. 29   5.5
  
Investment Committee (INV) Expertise 
NA 169 32.0 NA 379 71.6
No 73 13.8 No 98 18.5
Yes 287 54.3 Yes 52   9.8
   Total 529 100.0
Note: NA = no information is disclosed, No = the variable measured is absent and  
Yes = the variable measured is present. This result is for all trustees in the sample. 
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TABLE 3: OLS (heteroskedastic-robust) results for the disclosure of trustee information 
 Total Educational and Experience Completion Level Only 
Variables 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Constant 0.8780* 0.9154** 0.8309** 0.8173** 0.7828** 0.7793** 0.9877** 0.9876** 
Association- 
nominated 
-0.0355 -0.0236 -0.0283 -0.0174 0.0125 0.0092 0.0317 0.0293 
Member- 
nominated 
-0.1489** -0.1313* -0.1376* -0.1221† -0.0470 -0.0476 -0.0401 -0.0399 
Undergradua
te 
- - - - 0.0012 0.0413 0.0040 0.0093 
Postgraduate - - - - 0.0029 0.0064 0.0042 0.0073 
EDU 0.0144* 0.0146† 0.0146* 0.0141* - - - - 
IND% 0.5433† 0.5774† 0.6110* 0.6140* 0.2006** 0.1975** 0.1659** 0.1621** 
OUT 0.0212† 0.0259* 0.0207† 0.0252* 0.0004 0.0003 0.0015 0.0017 
BS -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0127* -0.0129* -0.0127* -0.0132* 
DC2009 -0.0000 - 0.0000 - -0.0000 - 0.0000 - 
DC Average - -0.0000 - -0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0000 
Log Size 
2009 0.0030 
- - - 0.0164* - - - 
Log Avg Size - -0.0074 - - - 0.0169* - - 
Member 
2009 - 
- 0.0000 - - - 0.0000* - 
Member  
Avg 6 yrs - 
- - -0.0000 - - - 0.0000** 
         
F-value    4.07    4.16  4.44   4.43 3.92 3.93 3.66 3.77 
Adj R-
squared 
0.2408 0.2507 0.2434 0.2505 0.1249 0.1257 0.1135 0.1192 
Ρ 0.0008 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 
N 61 60 61 60 116 116 116 116 
† significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                            
1 The Review recommends a Code of Trustee Governance, suggesting that effective trustee practices and 
structures will lead to enhanced performance in the industry (Cooper 2010).  
2 See (Myners 2000; Kakabadse et al. 2003; Clark et al. 2006) for trustee competency, background, roles, 
and effects.  
3 Part 6, Superannuation Industry (Supervision), Act 1993 (SIS Act 1993). 
4 There are currently only five large funds with natural person trustees (Cooper 2010), hence we do not 
differentiate the types of trustees in our examination. 
5 See Section 2 in Chapter 2 of Part 2 in (Cooper 2010) 
6 We also use two other proxies as the EDU index greatly reduces our sample size: (2) completion level 
(undergraduate and postgraduate dummy variables), and (3) formal qualification (buseco and artlaw 
dummy variables). 
7 PS146 as a proxy was dropped due to significant low disclosure. 
8 The CEO-Chairman duality variable is dropped because no incidence is present in the sample, reflecting 
that the two positions are held by separate individuals in all 66 industry superannuation funds. 
9 This study comprised of 48 of the top 200 funds in 2004-2005, where half of the sample were corporate 
funds. 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 This survey included 187 superannuation funds representing the whole population in 2006. 
11 The IND dummy is found to be a non-significant factor; therefore, results were not included in the table. 
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